BarkellWH -> RE: American Freedom? (Dec. 7 2012 15:50:52)
|
quote:
I am seriously interested in how Bill put away with the looting of the Eastern Block. He must obviously have found a way for himself to delcare the happenings none-existent or none-connected / none-aware to the western figures involved. Please re-read my post above, Ruphus, pointing out that it is not up to me or anyone else to prove a negative. You are the one making the charge of U.S. and Western government complicity in the looting of Russia and Eastern Europe, and it is your responsibility (having made the charge) to provide evidence supporting it. So far, you have not provided any evidence at all to support your charge. And your mention of a "Der Spiegel" article you read somewhere but can't find, is no evidence at all. No one denies that assets have been looted in Russia and Eastern Europe, and there is a lot of evidence that those assets have been looted by Russian and Eastern European oligarchs and thugs. But your contention that U.S. and Western governments were complicit in instigating and carrying out the looting requires evidence. Who are the "Western figures" you claim were involved, and what was their role? How were they connected to U.S. and Western governments? When you provide some solid evidence, Ruphus, we can review it, determine its validity, and respond. Miguel, your reference to General Smedley Butler brings up an interesting figure for sure. A highly-decorated Marine general (he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor twice), Smedley Butler did indeed rail against American imperialism in Central America. Regarding your reference to the plot against President Roosevelt, as I recall there was a group who plotted against Roosevelt, and they wanted Smedley Butler to lead them. Butler, however, refused to meet with them. I do not think he was involved in the plot, as he refused to meet with those who were involved and wanted him as a leader, and I don't think he was ever considered part of the plot. American intervention in Central America must be understood as more than just protecting business interests (United Fruit), although that was a major concern. It really was the result of the Monroe Doctrine (which claimed Central America and the Caribbean as an American sphere of influence) and the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (which was aimed at European powers, and claimed America would intervene in Central America and the Caribbean if there was a threat of European intervention in the region). It was precipitated by the Venezuelan crisis of 1902. Venezuela had reneged on its debt payments to European powers, and, as creditors, Britain and Germany sent warships to blockade Venezuela and collect their debts by force, if necessary. Roosevelt intervened and defused the crisis. Subsequent to the announcement of the "Roosevelt Corollary," the U.S. intervened in Santo Domingo in 1905, and Haiti and Nicaragua later, primarily as a result of those countries' refusal to honor their debts to the European powers. One of the first things the U.S. did after intervention was to take over the customs house, collect the duties, and make sure the country began repaying its debts. To be sure, this was not a policy based on altruism. It was done out of U.S. national interest to keep the European powers at bay. My point is that American intervention in Central America and the Caribbean is a little more nuanced than just to protect United Fruit. Richard, Although most of my career was in Southeast Asia, I was involved in Central America some time after your experience. I was assigned to the American Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras from April 1979 until April 1981. Three months after I arrived, the Sandinistas overthrew Somoza and took power in Nicaragua. Most of us in the Embassy were very glad to see Somoza go, and there was hope that the Sandinistas might reject some of their Marxist ideas once in power and open up the political system in Nicaragua. The U.S. was ready to provide them aid. (Under the Carter Administration, there was an immediate tranche of $75 million dollars that would have been made available, had the Sandinistas opened things up.) Alas, it was not to be. The Sandinistas increased both political and economic repression. They confiscated most private property, nationalized the banks and major businesses, and they refused to accommodate even moderate businessmen. The reason they lost the subsequent election you mentioned was because they had driven the economy into the ground. Part of that was due to U.S. pressure and support of the Contras, but a large part was simply a result of their economic program. As soon as they announced nationalization of the banking system, any Nicaraguan with brains shipped his money to Miami banks. And the Sandinistas did not welcome foreign investment, thus cutting off any possiblity of income and jobs that creates. Thus, the economy went downhill fast and stayed there. There were many of us who had hopes for Nicaragua after the overthrow of Somoza. That those hopes were not realized was not due to those, such as myself, who remained Foreign Service Officers. Many of us did not agree with U.S. support of the Contras, but we did not see Nicaragua's salvation in the Sandinistas either. Your resignation from your position because you did not agree with U.S. policy was admirable and honorable, Richard, and it suited your personal circumstances. But that does not mean that those who continued to carry out U.S. government policy were any less admirable and honorable, and devoted to both the U.S. national interest and the interest of the countries involved. We all make our decisions and commitments, and in most cases one is neither more nor less admirable and honorable than the other. And I'm sure you will agree that there can be multiple legitimate takes and ideas on the best course of action the U.S. should pursue as well. As a side note. When the Sandinistas took over in July 1979, many of Somoza's Air Force crews flew their planes to Tegucigalpa for refuge. After several months of negotiations, an agreement was reached whereby the Sandinista air crews could come to Tegucigalpa, take possession of the aircraft, and fly them back to Managua. The only hotel worthy of the name in those days was the Hotel Maya, located in the center of Tegucigalpa. Several of us would retire to the Hotel Maya bar after work and have a few beers. When the Sandinista air crews showed up to claim their aircraft, they naturally stayed at the Maya. There were three evenings when several of us from the American Embassy were drinking at one end of the bar and the Sandinista air crews were drinking at the other end. Neither spoke to the other (other than "buenas noches"), as protocol on both sides would not have countenanced fraternization, but it made for one of those odd moments one occasionally experiences in the course of one's duties. Cheers, Bill
|
|
|
|